The two stories of the habitus/structure relation and the riddle of reflexivity:A meta-theoretical reappraisal by Bouzanis, Christoforos & Kemp, Stephen
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two stories of the habitus/structure relation and the riddle of
reflexivity
Citation for published version:
Bouzanis, C & Kemp, S 2020, 'The two stories of the habitus/structure relation and the riddle of reflexivity: A
meta-theoretical reappraisal', Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 64-83.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12225
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/jtsb.12225
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bouzanis, C, Kemp, S. The two stories of the
habitus/structure relation and the riddle of reflexivity: A metatheoretical reappraisal. J Theory Soc Behav. 2019;
1– 20. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12225, which has been published in final form at
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jtsb.12225. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes
in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Sep. 2020
1 
 
Title: The Two Stories of the Habitus/Structure Relation and the 
Riddle of Reflexivity: A Meta-theoretical Reappraisal 
 
Running title: Habitus, Structure and Reflexivity 
 
Christoforos Bouzanis and Stephen Kemp 
 
Author Affiliation: Christoforos Bouzanis (Swansea University), Stephen Kemp (University 
of Edinburgh) 
 
The authors contributed equally to this endeavour; it was a true act of collaboration. 
 
The authors have no conflict of interest to declare 
The authors have received no financial support for the research of this article  
 
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Professor John Scott for his comments 
on a draft of this paper.  
 
Abstract 
This article argues that two key puzzles arising from the theories of Bourdieu are inter-related.  
One is the question of how Bourdieu analyses the relationship between structure and habitus, 
and the other is the place of reflexivity in Bourdieu’s work.  We contend that it is only by 
carefully analysing Bourdieu’s theoretical structure to grasp the relationship between these 
elements that one can understand whether or not his work offers useful resources for analysing 
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the relation between routine action and self-reflection. This paper argues that there are two 
narrations of the structure/habitus relation in Bourdieu’s work, and that the concept of self-
reflective subjectivity is a residual element of the first narration and does not appear in the 
second. We then contend that this residual and under-developed concept of self-reflective 
subjectivity should not be confused with Bourdieu’s analysis of epistemic reflexivity.  These 
moves allow us to contribute to ongoing debates about the relation between routine action and 
self-reflection by arguing that the concept of the “reflexive habitus” – which some have argued 
is characteristic of social agents in high/late modernity – is both conceptually confused and is 
not a logical extension of Bourdieu’s theories. In this way we try to clear the ground for more 
productive ways of thinking about routine action and self-reflection. 
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Pierre Bourdieu is one of the most significant sociological thinkers of the past 50 years.  He 
introduced a powerful set of concepts that addressed key concerns of sociologists, extending 
the analytical repertoire and focus of the discipline. However, Bourdieu’s legacy has been 
highly contested, and disputes about the interpretation of his work in relation to central concepts 
such as habitus, reflexivity and field, as well as issues such as the role of conscious thought in 
social change, continue to exercise sociologists.   
One thoroughly discussed question is whether Bourdieu’s theory is highly deterministic 
or not. Some authors comment on this debate by that because of its determinism and 
reductionism, Bourdieu’s thought does not allow for the possibility of agency and self-
reflection, and also fails to explain social change (See, for example, Alexander 1995; Archer, 
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2007, 2010, 2012; King, 2000; Mouzelis, 2003). Others adopt the idea that there is an element 
of determinism in Bourdieu’s thought, but see this as the quasi-determinism of a critical realist 
social theory (see, for example, Decoteau, 2016; Nash, 2003; Potter, 2000) which can allow for 
both structural impulses and agency in the social domain. Others deny the characterization of 
determinism, and defend a narration of Bourdieu’s thought that points to his late admissions 
and analyses of social change (see, for example, Faber, 2017; Hilgers, 2009) and/or social 
mobility (Friedman, 2016). And some take a further step on this “positive” path, claiming that 
Bourdieu’s analysis not only allows for the explanation of social change and social mobility, 
but is also consistent with continuous reflection on socio-cultural developments by intuitive 
agents (see, for example, Adams, 2006; Sweetman, 2003) – or even that it describes a pliable 
world subject to negotiation via the constructing of world-visions, such that Bourdieu’s analysis 
“borders on a kind of idealism” (Mead, 2016, p. 67), while it allows for non-occasional 
possibilities of conscious deliberation (Mead, 2016).   
We are arguing that instead of taking sides on the debate of “the right interpretation” of 
Bourdieu’s work, we should rather focus on its inherent antinomies and inconsistencies. We are 
aware that this might seem a radical argument, as many authors, in their efforts to present a 
single story to be told about Bourdieu, either in positive or negative terms, actually imply that 
Bourdieu’s writing is characterized by precision and consistency. Indeed, there are few analyses 
(like King, 2000) of how the various reactions and stances towards Bourdieu’s core theoretical 
work are not a matter of “the right interpretation” of a coherent theoretical system, but the 
unavoidable outcome of theorizing that is characterized by internal antinomies.  
Following these lines, this article does not provide another overall critical presentation 
of Pierre Bourdieu’s work. It rather aims to show that there are two prevalent tendencies in 
Bourdieu’s core socio-theoretical system, and more specifically, in his theory about the relation 
between two elements. The first element is objective conditions (structures) that constrain 
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agents, and within which agents find the material and immaterial objects that are also the objects 
of their struggles which take place in structured fields.  The second element is the internalized 
cognitive structure, that is habitus, which provides the categories of comprehension and 
appreciation of the practices and of the rules, according to which these struggles over the 
acquisition of the valued objects are taking place in the various structured “battle fields” of 
social life (see, Bourdieu, 1989). Bourdieu’s theory of practice is premised on these two 
elements and their relation, in that they are assumed to be simultaneously the conditions of the 
production of and the constructed outcome of practices. In this article, we recognize the 
importance of the theory of practice to Bourdieu’s work, and we are focusing on different 
readings of analyses of the crucial pre-conditions of practice, which are also consequential for 
its outcomes.  As such, we will be arguing that there are different readings of Bourdieu’s work 
because of Bourdieu’s dual account of the structure-habitus relation. In other words, it is 
Bourdieu’s tendency to discuss two different modes of relationship between the habitus and the 
field, sometimes even in the same section of a book, that has triggered further dichotomies and 
interpretations within debates amongst his commentators, including questions about the import 
of his work for understanding the role and scope of transformation and reproduction in social 
life. 
As we shall show, both readings refer to the same two basic concepts, namely, habitus 
and social structure, as well as their relational mode of mutual dependence. Therefore, the lack 
of internal coherence of the theoretical system does not entail the existence of two totally 
incompatible or incommensurable theoretical systems that intend to explain the same 
phenomenon or object, but the existence of two different narrations that lie conflated, and in a 
latent form, in Bourdieu’s theoretical system.  
Having made this argument we contend that it is necessary to grasp a further element of 
the topography of Bourdieu’s thought in order to understand subsequent debates and indeed the 
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possibilities inherent in his mode of analysis.  We will argue that it is crucial to distinguish the 
incoherent core of his socio-theoretical system, that we have been discussing, from a further 
element: epistemological and theoretical remarks about reflexivity which Bourdieu makes that 
(are frequently assumed to) have indirect implications regarding the possibility of agential self-
reflection. To properly locate Bourdieu’s remarks we argue for the importance of distinguishing 
epistemic reflexivity, on the one hand, from self-reflection/agential reflexivity1, on the other. 
By epistemic reflexivity we mean the application of socio-theoretical systems to their own 
academic microcosm, such that the general characterizations of social relations put forward 
within a theoretical system have an (explicit or implicit) import for the analysis of the conditions 
of theory-production themselves (see, Bouzanis, 2017). In other words it is the self-application 
of a theory.  Self-reflection/agential reflexivity refers to the capacities of agents to reflect on 
their social situation and formulate a course of action on the basis of these reflections. 
 Armed with this distinction we argue that some authors have seized on Bourdieu’s 
remarks about epistemic reflexivity as a basis to argue that his system can consistently 
incorporate a meaningful concept of agential reflexivity.  However, we contend that this is a 
problematic move because, for both narrations, the habitus is the social unconscious, which 
defines the pre-reflective cognitive liabilities of agents’ apprehension and appreciation – 
theoretically expressed in terms of embodied dispositions to certain (and not other) thoughts 
and actions. On either narration, the habitus offers the only means of agents’ understanding of 
what is happening “out there” in the social world and how they should evaluate it and react 
upon it. Bourdieu leaves no space for any other kind of sociological conceptualization of 
agential reflexivity, except for what he conceived of as only a marginal mode of rational and 
strategic thinking which he meticulously opposed when discussing other philosophical 
traditions.  
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Accordingly, we contend that some commentators on Bourdieu are trying to reconcile 
the irreconcilable. More specifically, utilizing a metatheoretical mapping of Bourdieu’s core 
and peripheral theoretical elements, we argue that, in view of the residual character of self-
reflection in his work, contemporary references to the possibility of the emergence of the 
“reflexive habitus” in late/high modernization invoke one of the most confused concepts in 
contemporary social theory.   This is because the “reflexive habitus” is the product of the fusion 
of both narrations in Bourdieu’s core statements, as well as of the problematic residue of self-
reflection. Yet, our analysis does not entail that habitual and routine action are not reconcilable 
with the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity. Our argument is rather that the Bourdieusian 
notion of the habitus is irreconcilable with the possibility of self-reflection. We also suggest 
that there are useful analyses in the literature that offer a good start in the important effort to 
combine habitual action, routine action and self-reflection, which, however, frequently remain 
entrapped in Bourdieu’s terms.   
 
Relating Habitus and Structure: Bourdieu’s Two Stories 
For Bourdieu, subjectivism/objectivism and structure/agency are false dualities. In order to 
transcend them, we first need to theoretically (re-)construct the objective structure and the 
distribution of resources within it, and then take into account the categories of perception and 
appreciation which structure the actions of the agents, which is the internalized, homologous 
cognitive version of the objective social structure. Internalization here implies ontological 
complicity between the habitus and material structure. Yet, as Wacquant explicates, 
“epistemological priority is granted to objectivist rupture over subjectivist understanding.” 
(1992, p. 11) since “cumulative exposure to certain social conditions instills in individuals an 
ensemble of durable and transposable dispositions that internalize the necessities of the extant 
social environment, inscribing inside the organism the patterned inertia and constraints of 
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external reality.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 13) Hence, the habitus is the embodied, 
internalized version of the corresponding structure of the field in which agents exist. The 
habitus is thus the orientating principle of perception, of appreciation, and, consequently, of 
action, produced by objective conditions (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78).  This means that, for 
Bourdieu, “each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy nilly, is a producer and reproducer of 
objective meaning.” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 79)   
It is this idea of the reproduction of objective meaning that has led many commentators 
of Bourdieu to accuse his work of an over-determined world-view, in which the reproduction 
of social space is the rule. And it is at this point that the first account of the habitus-structure 
relation has led many authors to argue that this world-view does not allow for any kind of 
dialectical relation between structure and habitus, since it is objective structures that are granted 
the prior and predominant power.  We refer to this account as HS/P1 to indicate that it is the 
first version of a theorization of how habitus and structure are related such that they provide the 
preconditions of practice and also exercise a great influence over its outcomes.  Within HS/P1, 
the concepts of economic and cultural capital contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms 
of structural reproduction (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 19).  This is because the structure of the 
distribution of the different forms of capital contributes, for each different class position and 
through the internalization of its homologous cognitive structure, to its perpetuation. The 
agents’ conceptions and apprehension of these forms of capital – what these forms of capital 
signify and what to do with them – are provided only through the categories given by the social 
unconscious, the habitus.  
According to HS/P1, not only is socio-cultural reproduction the rule, but social mobility, 
where and when it takes place, is a contingent output that occurs due to some occasional lack 
of prescriptions of the habitus, the contingencies of practice, or when the fuzziness of the social 
unconscious cannot allow for complete assimilation and mental incorporation of the complex 
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details of structural dynamics: structures perpetuate their rationale and agents cannot even 
“reflect” on the possibility of a different position-taking. The dispositional basis of their 
knowledge and action is based on their location within the structure. 
According to HS/P1, the mediation of the objective meaning of the social conditions by 
the habitus entails the mediation of fixed possibilities of praxis to agential interaction. 
Therefore, one could argue that Bourdieu cannot justify the claim – which we will analyze in a 
moment and refer to as HS/P2 – that practices can only be accounted for through a dialectical 
relation between the structures and the habitus; for their existential relation can better be 
explained “by relating the objective structure defining the social conditions of the production 
of the habitus which engendered them to the conditions in which this habitus is operating, that 
is, to the conjuncture which, short of a radical transformation, represents a particular state of 
this structure.” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78)2 This is an admission of the impossibility of any kind 
of dialectic because there is no meaningful independence between the interacting elements.  
Past structure replicates itself in present structure, and habitus has no independent input into the 
orientation of practices that construct the structure. 
In HS/P1 Bourdieu has replaced an old-fashioned mechanistic version of structuralism 
– which explains social action exclusively in terms of the identification of the social position 
of each group of agents – with a mild version of social structuralism accompanied by the fuzzy 
logic of practice. In order to account for practice in this way, a conjuncture between past and 
present structures is required, and the habitus becomes the mediator of this conjuncture. Hence, 
while always attacking social mechanics (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990b), Bourdieu claims that “the 
social mechanisms that ensure the production of compliant habitus are, here as elsewhere, an 
integral part of the conditions of reproduction of the social order and of the productive apparatus 
itself” (Bourdieu, 1990b, pp. 129-130). 
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Therefore, according to HS/P1, agents behave like sleepwalkers who have a minimal 
sense of the objects around them with no possibility of an action that can radically rearrange 
the spatial setting and order of these objects. They can, at best, wake up for a while in the rare 
situation that an external disturbance somehow occurs. Can this version of ontological 
complicity, this immanent necessity of material conditioning expressed through embodiment 
(see, Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72), be interrupted so as to leave some space for reflection and 
contemplation? There are points at which Bourdieu even completely eradicates self-reflection 
as a possibility:  
 
… the structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the 
material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce 
habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the 
generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be 
objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product of 
obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to 
attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the 
product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72) 
 
This exclusion of conscious agential conduct from the conduct of the habitus3 will form 
the basis of our effort to argue that, for Bourdieu, reflective activity is a residual category in 
relation to the main body of his theory of habitus and structures. It is “residual” because, at 
some points, Bourdieu seems to concede some theoretical space to his main “opponent”, namely 
rational/strategic action, in the rare cases where we have a mismatch between habitus and the 
structure, or an external shock. In his In Other Words (1990a), for example, Bourdieu states:  
 
The relation which obtains between habitus and the field to which it is 
objectively adjusted … is a sort of ontological complicity, a subconscious and 
pre-reflexive fit. This complicity manifests itself in what we call the sense of the 
game or ‘feel’ for the game … an intentionality without intention which 
functions as the principle of strategies devoid of strategic design, without 
rational computation and without the conscious positing of ends. (by way of 
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aside, habitus is one principle of production of practices among others and 
although it undoubtedly more frequently in play than any other … one cannot 
rule out that it may be superseded under certain circumstances – certainly 
situations of crisis which disrupt the immediate adjustment of habitus to field – 
by other principles, such as rational and conscious computation. (Bourdieu, 
1990a, p. 108) 
 
We can now be clear about HS/P1: social reproduction is the rule due to the specific relation 
between the habitus and the social structure; and structural transformation and/or social 
mobility are feasible when rational and/or conscious activity is necessitated by exceptional 
circumstances which allow the sleepwalkers to awaken temporarily.  
However, there are remarks of Bourdieu’s which point to a somewhat different relation 
between habitus and structure: one that we refer to as HS/P2. Whereas in HS/P1 the habitus is 
presented as a “spiritual automaton” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 57), in HS/P2 it is presented as an 
“effective demand” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 65). In this latter sense, the habitus is a multi-layered 
prism, allowing a kaleidoscopic view of past and unexpected experience, as well as “creative 
responses”, as Wacquant (2016, p. 65; 2014, p. 122) claims, and is not a mere conductor 
reassuring the continuous reproduction of pre-existing material conditions.  
While, according to HS/P1, social reproduction is the rule and requires the habitus to be 
a “practical operator” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 95), defined and embodied (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 54) 
– and social transformation and structural differentiations are contingent outputs of human 
interaction, mainly having an exogenous cause – according to HS/P2, social transformation is 
always inherent in the system as a possibility resulting from the dialectical relationship (see, 
for example, Akram, 2013; Potter, 2000) between the embodied, incorporated cognitive 
structure and the objective structures. According to HS/P2, the habitus can offer agents a set of 
bodily movements and cognitive means to cope with the battles in the different fields, but does 
not lead to definite sets of possible reactions to unexpected or unprecedented situations. In his 
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In Other Words (1990a) Bourdieu explains that “the same habitus can lead to very different 
practices and stances depending on the state of the field” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 116).  
Note that in both HS/P1 and HS/P2 practice is fuzzy, which means that in both stories, 
there is no behaviourist, one-to-one, or linear correspondence between contextual incentives 
and re-actions. As such, in both stories there is no perfect predictability of limitedly spontaneous 
practice. However, spontaneity takes two paths in Bourdieu’s work: while in HS/P1 we 
encounter a limited set of potential actions and reactions that can be identified in certain fields 
(the structural organization of which imprints objective meaning in the cognitive structures that 
limit agents’ reproductive stances and practices), in HS/P2 the flexible habitus can transcend 
the limits of the “taken for granted” and combines or synthesizes heterogeneous toolkits of 
(past) and for (potential) action. Therefore, quasi-determinism of objectively regulated sets of 
(still unpredictable) practice (HS/P1) here, in HS/P2, takes the form of limited (though still non-
reflective4) creativity of mental frames of the doable and intelligible with floating boundaries. 
Different actions and reactions can lead to a different socio-cultural space, and consequently a 
new habitus – which is here endlessly transformed (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 116). The imposition 
of one’s world-view through manipulation of another’s habitus is always in the stakes of these 
battles (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 134).  To take another example, again from In Other Words 
(1990a), offered a few pages later than the previous quotation we have used,  
 
… I do not see where my readers could have found the model of circular 
reproduction which they attribute to me (Structure → habitus → structure). 
Indeed, I could show how the opposition between statics and dynamics, structure 
and history, reproduction and transformation, etc., is totally fictitious, in so far 
as it is the structure (the tensions, the oppositions, the relations of power which 
constitute the structure of a specific field or of the social field as a totality at a 
given point of time) which constitutes the principle of the strategies aimed at 
preserving or transforming the structure. (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 118) 
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Therefore, in HS/P2, socio-cultural transformation is a potential outcome of the dynamics of 
the production of the social space – though reproduction of practices and of the social structures 
should be expected to be the more frequent result. While for HS/P1 transformation is generated 
by an exogenous event, for HS/P2 transformation is mainly an endogenous possibility. If agents 
have internalised a relatively limited, but also adequate, pool of liabilities to action and reaction, 
throughout the various struggles they participate in for the acquisition of the different forms of 
capital that are related to each field of battle, then there is a dialectical relationship between 
structures and the related habituses, which takes the form of what Bourdieu calls “the dialectic 
of objectification and embodiment” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 87). Though the external material 
conditions leave their mental blueprint on how actors cognitively organise their visions and 
divisions of the world, this pre-reflectively formulated cognitive structure can lead them to 
divergent apprehensions, evaluations and, consequently re-actions – with a further result that 
their limited world-constructing principles of action can result in unpredictable practices (See, 
Hilgers, 2009). In more “extreme” formulations of HS/P2 (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 729; 1989, p. 
23), world-views do not necessarily express extant external necessities and divisions; for 
classification is part of the processes of the structuring of the battlefields.  
Note that here objectification does not entail or presuppose a reflective subjectivity 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 91), but an endless, and also conditioned, production of thoughts, 
perceptions, expressions and actions (1977, p. 95) in the agents’ confrontation of the material 
and immaterial objects, where the relation between these objects is imprinted in the mental 
polymorphic possibilities of action that are internalised through socialization. The occurrence 
of “Mismatch”, “hysteresis”5 or broken isomorphism between the habitus and the objective 
structures is not necessarily generating the need for self-reflection, as in HS/P1.  Rather, in 
HS/P2, the habitus activates institutions, revives the sense deposited in them, while imposing 
“the revisions and transformations that reactivation entails” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 57); it 
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becomes a malleable, pervasive, multi-layered and ever-expanding veil that can meaningfully 
“cover”, adapt to, respond to and, eventually, effect (through action) structural fragmentation: 
a dialectic between structural fragmentation and its mental unification through a relational 
cognitive structure that enables agential engagement with the former.  
We can see this approach in readings of Bourdieu that fit closely with HS/P2. For 
example, Decoteau (2016, p. 306) admits that for Bourdieu, “over time, the habitus was meant 
to overcome the disjunction of hysteresis”, rather than self-reflection being promoted.  
Likewise, Hilgers (2009), mainly following HS/P2, downplays the assumed emergence of self-
reflection in cases of hysteresis, since habitus as an analogical schema allows that, 
 
… the creative perception of a sense whose newness depends on the situation is 
put to work. This sense is produced by the immanent law of habitus that makes 
the agent adjust, un-adjust, and readjust his or her practices to be compatible 
with objective reality as it appears subjectively. (2009, p. 734)  
 
Though for Mead (2016), clearly following HS/P2, we can combine this version of 
flexible-transposable habitus, as unifying principle of practice, with the possibility of agential 
reflection, the idea of self-reflection in this story becomes redundant: “the habitus is a 
spontaneity without consciousness or will, opposed as much to the mechanical necessity of 
things without history in mechanistic theories as it is to the reflexive freedom of subjects 
‘without inertia’ in rationalist theories.” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 56) We underline this to indicate 
that while a version of the rationalist approach to agential reflexivity remains a residual element 
in HS/P1, that is a theoretically unrelated and occasional possibility, this is absent in HS/P2.  
Therefore, our account of the core socio-theoretical system of Pierre Bourdieu shows 
that there are two incompatible narrations that lie infused with each other in his texts. By 
claiming that they are “infused”, we neither take them to be the two extreme poles of a 
continuum of theoretical variations of a generic worldview, as if one can identify many 
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instantiations of it throughout Bourdieu’s texts; nor do we present them as clear-cut elements 
that follow one another in subsequent sub-sections or paragraphs, as if Bourdieu suddenly 
“switches” mode of thought at transition points at which we move from the one moment to the 
other. We cannot theoretically reconstruct Bourdieu’s various core arguments into one single 
story of the habitus-structure relation. Rather, two incompatible narrations emerge in a 
theoretical reconstruction that uncovers the latent division between them, which remains 
unclear in and through textual continuity and semantical instability.  This is especially apparent 
in cases of condensed arguments, the ambivalence of which is generated by the compression of 
two incompatible worldviews.  
Let us now make brief reference to two commentators who got close to the distinction 
between the two narrations we have described. First, Richard Jenkins, in relation to the 
definitions of the habitus and its relation to objective conditions, mentions that there are three 
views in Bourdieu’s work: “objective conditions produce habitus, the habitus is adjusted to 
objective conditions, and there is a reciprocal or dialectical relationship between them.” 
(Jenkins, 1992, p. 79) Jenkins’ insightful remark is not further developed, in relation to how the 
first view (HS/P1, in our terms) can be distinguished from the second and third views (HS/P2, 
in our terms). In fact, Jenkins (1992) does not adequately analyse the “third view”, with the 
result that a few pages later, he claims that there is an “inability to account or allow for 
endogenous or internally generated change” (1992, p. 90) in Bourdieu’s work – thus setting 
aside Bourdieu’s implications for the flexible habitus of HS/P2.  
Secondly, Anthony King (2000) offers one of the few analyses that highlights an inner 
core tension in Bourdieu’s work. He identifies an inner tension between Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice, which allows for virtuosos who draw on shared understandings so as to modify current 
practices and structures and Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus which signifies Bourdieu’s retreat 
to objectivism. This is because, according to the latter theory, “not only does Bourdieu 
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emphasize the existence of objective economic and conceptual structures (the habitus), but the 
interactional, intersubjective element of social life which was central to his ‘practical theory’ is 
effaced by a solipsistic theory where the lone individual is now attached to an objective social 
structure.” (King, 2000, p. 423) Yet, what King (2000) misrecognizes is that Bourdieu’s theory 
of practice cannot be conceived of separately from the notion of the habitus, and therefore, the 
“flexibility” that King identifies in Bourdieu’s descriptions of the struggles in the field, in which 
agents are supposed to strategically manipulate (their own and others’) habituses, does not 
constitute an independent theory of practice.  Rather, drawing on our analysis of Bourdieu’s 
work, King’s account of Bourdieu’s “theory of practice” falls under the HS/P2 narration, while 
King’s understanding of the habitus under HS/P1.  
As Lizardo says, in response to King, “Bourdieu’s idea of practical action cannot be 
understood without rethinking the way that Bourdieu conceived of the notion of an embodied 
schema and the way that he deployed the concept of operations.” (Lizardo, 2004, p. 380) Yet, 
Omar Lizardo, a prominent figure in American sociology, is shown to be another victim of this 
inner division that exists in Bourdieu’s analysis. In Lizardo (2004), he argues – clearly 
following HS/P2 – for a notion of the habitus that denotes a generative, 
transposable/transferable, flexible, dynamic cognitive/bodily structure which integrates 
experience (2004, p. 391) and adapts to the fluidity of structured fields, and which also can be 
automatically modified and revised in view of new environmental configurations (2004, p. 
387). Here the habitus is participating in a dialectical story (2004, p. 385) of mutual constitution 
with the structured settings (Lizardo, 2004, p. 381). Yet, while for Lizardo (2004, pp. 391–392) 
“mismatch” cases are resolved by the same flexible and creative habitus, Strand and Lizardo 
(2017) – clearly following HS/P1 – thoroughly discuss the consequences of hysteresis as a case 
of inability of past embodied dispositions for action to correspond to new/different structural 
settings; one of these consequences is the emergence of “reflexiveness”, as a rare and 
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exceptional case of representational formulation of belief, which “can provide the basis for 
schematic transfers into new practical belief.” (Strand & Lizardo, 2017, p. 188) 
All in all, contra King (2000), we argue that the notion of the habitus is central to 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice and that there are two stories to be told about how the habitus 
relates to the structure(s) of the various field(s).  
 
What is the Problem with Epistemic Reflexivity in Bourdieu’s Thought? 
In Bourdieu’s work, self-reflection becomes not only a residual, but also an antinomic element 
that appears in HS/P1. It is a residue because it appears sporadically in Bourdieu’s work as an 
unrelated implication or an unsupported reference. And it is “antinomic” because claims 
involving this concept do not fit with the main body of the theoretical system, but rather exist 
in a relation of contradiction with core claims (see Bouzanis & Kemp, 2019). However, there 
are several authors, as we explain below, who think that Bourdieu was open to the possibility 
of giving a meaningful role to self-reflection. We argue that this paradoxical claim, made by 
these authors, is partially due to (i) Bourdieu’s own dual conceptualization of the habitus-
structure relation that we have already discussed; partially due to (ii) the surprising appearance 
of the residual category of self-reflection; and partially due to (iii) generalized confusion about 
the differences between epistemic reflexivity and agential reflexivity/self-reflection. Having 
discussed (i) and (ii) in the previous section we now turn to discuss (iii).  
To explore this we would like to consider an aspect of Bourdieu’s work that might seem 
promising for those hoping to find a substantial development of the concept of self-reflection 
in his work: his ideas about epistemic reflexivity. These are mainly developed in Bourdieu’s 
later works, in his analyses of the field of sociology and the scientific field in general.  
Bourdieu’s key argument in these works is that social scientists should engage in a process of 
reflexivity through which they can identify their own position within the scientific field. 
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Responding to the “reflexive turn” in the sociology of scientific knowledge (see, 
Ashmore, 1989; Gruenberg, 1978; Woolgar 1988), Bourdieu argued that sociologists 
collectively need to use their own methods and concepts to make the field of sociology an object 
in order to eliminate circularities and social determinisms which affect its capacity for progress. 
But their use should be continuous and intensive. Epistemic reflexivity, as a collective project, 
invites the sociological community to become conscious of (and thus reflect on) the shared 
social conditions of the presuppositions with which we engage in constructing the sociological 
object. Hence, for Bourdieu, epistemic reflexivity (2003, 2004) is a request, an invitation as 
well as an expectation of future sociological research, necessitated by the logic of sociological 
practice and thus internalized in and through the struggles among the sociologists, to objectify 
the conditions of the production of the social space of scholastic vision which is prevalent in 
academia (for further discussion, see Hilgers, 2009; Maton, 2003; Peters, 2014). It is a request 
to “objectify the knowing subject” (Heilbron, 1999, p. 301), that is, the subject of objectification 
in its objectively structured academic microcosm, in which certain determinations should be 
identified and partially eradicated.   
It might seem as if Bourdieu’s account of epistemic reflexivity can provide a basis for 
analyzing self-reflection more generally in society, undermining our claim that the latter is an 
antinomic category for Bourdieu. However, we would argue that the situation is quite the 
reverse: because self-reflection is never substantially developed by Bourdieu, this vitiates his 
account of epistemic reflexivity rather than the latter vindicating the former. In order to show 
this, we decompose Bourdieu’s quite complex requirement for a reflexive sociology into three 
analytically distinct moments, evaluating each of these:  
 
A) Auto-reference: To start this analysis, we need to distinguish between, on the one hand, 
self-reflection, or agential reflexivity, as an agential capacity to critically reflect on beliefs, 
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values, world-views and assumptions, as well as the wider or local, cultural or structural 
context; and, on the other hand, epistemic reflexivity as pointing to the paradoxes of self-
reference in the sociology of knowledge (Bohman, 1997, pp. 173, 177), or to the auto-
referential properties of grande theoretical frameworks (Bouzanis, 2017).  It is this latter 
interest in self-reference and its consequences which Bourdieu is promoting in the discussion 
of epistemic reflexivity. Bouzanis (2017) states that Bourdieu was a pioneer in that he 
reflexively (that is, auto-referentially) bent his proposed core concepts to “apply” them to (the 
explanation of the position of) the social scientist and the field of symbolic struggles, within 
which s/he is positioned. This means that Bourdieu analyzes the space of position-taking for 
the social scientist as the possible and permitted sets of strategies and visions of the world, 
which are defined (in terms of probabilities) by the social scientific field through the prism of 
the dispositions of the habitus (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 58); and this clearly shows that he 
recognizes the applicability of his core concepts to the academic field as well (see, Bourdieu, 
1988). As Bohman says, in view of Bourdieu’s theory of practice, “the search for a general 
theory of social agency and constraint usually begins by referring to a set of phenomena that 
constitute its successful core, from which it gradually generalizes other instances.” (1997, p. 
173) To our mind this is a very useful move of Bourdieu’s, as the ability of a social theory to 
be consistently applied to itself is a valuable “test” of that theory.  
B) The toolkit for self-objectification: in addition to the previous step, Bourdieu’s call for 
a reflexive sociology constitutes an emancipatory call to reflect on position/position-taking 
relation in the field(s) of social sciences. In this sense, it constitutes a call for a semi-conscious 
following of the path of the auto-referential application of the core conceptual framework he 
proposes onto sociologists’ positioning and the material and symbolic conditions of 
sociological research itself, by objectifying the structural positionality, the habitus and their 
co-production of the position-takings and practices of the social scientists themselves, in both 
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abstract and personified levels (for a characteristic analysis of this moment, see Bourdieu, 
2003).  
However, Bourdieu’s theory lacks a concept of a self-reflective subjectivity (see, for 
example, Archer, 2010, 2012; Bohman, 1997; Jenkins 1994; King, 2000; Peters, 2014) who 
could meaningfully respond to and successfully perpetuate his request for such an active self-
analysis.  To be epistemically reflexive, Bourdieu says, we sociologists need to objectify our 
position through the empirical use of his own theoretical/conceptual toolkit; but the subject 
that can enact objectification is absent in this theoretical toolkit. On this, several critiques 
point to the paradoxes of Bourdieu’s notion of epistemic reflexivity by highlighting the 
determinate relation between scientists’ positions and their world-views (Maton, 2003; Pels, 
2000, pp. 13-15), which implies that any objectification is condemned to field-determination 
or partiality. Consistent with this critique, but besides what positionality meant in either 
HS/P1 or HS/P2 in different fields, we are highlighting the broader idea that in the world(s) 
which the relation(s) between the habitus and the social structures allow to exist, there is no 
reflective subject to “apply” these concepts to the social scientific field.  
C) Collective/sociological habitualization of field/positions/dispositions-objectification: 
Bourdieu asks sociologists to take a further step in the promotion of epistemic reflexivity by 
requiring and expecting the genesis of a collective/sociological dispositional embedding of 
sociological self-analysis. His expectation is that the scientific community of sociologists will 
come to internalize the application of certain concepts in a process of objectification of the 
knowing subject’s structural position and the related habitus (Bourdieu, 2003):  
 
… sociologists have to convert reflexivity into a disposition constitutive of their 
scientific habitus, a reflexivity reflex, capable of acting not ex post, on the opus 
operatum, but a priori, on the modus operandi (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 89).  
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In other words, the project of epistemic reflexivity should “permeate” sociology to such an 
extent that it will (or should) become a group reflex.  
Even if we move swiftly over the apparently paradoxical requirement to internalize self-
objectification in the pre-reflective system of sociologists’ dispositions, it is unintelligible 
how, in the sociological battlefield, differently positioned sociologists could attain a 
consensus over the set of categories that would be used to identify the determinations that 
pertain to this field.  It is these categories that would be drawn on to empirically utilize this 
reflex in the examination of more specific cases of the positioning of certain specialties or 
certain research groups. Note, finally, that this third step in Bourdieu’s account of reflexivity 
is the one that is mostly responsible for the confusion of the idea of the “reflexive habitus” 
which will be examined in the next section.  
 
It is reasonable for Bourdieu himself to identify the auto-referential properties of his 
core theoretical framework (A), as they arise from the generality of the conditions of 
knowledgeability and belief-formation it describes, as well as from the transferability of its core 
conceptual apparatus to sociological self-descriptions. It is also legitimate for Bourdieu to wish 
for future sociologists, who adopt his proposed theoretical toolkit, to trace the path of this 
transferability of this toolkit to the sociological field (B), and thus enact their application to the 
battles which take place within it. But, having rendered self-reflection a residual element in 
HS/P1, this legitimate wish of (B) remains an empty promise from a theorist who clearly 
downplays the possibility of self-reflection. In view of this, collective sociological 
objectification (C) seems, in both HS/P1 and HS/P2, an additional and even more untenable 
requirement.  
In this section we have been arguing that whilst Bourdieu does have a theory of 
epistemic reflexivity, this is not the same as a theory of the self-reflective capacities of 
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sociologists. Indeed, Bourdieu does not even get as far as providing an analysis of the self-
reflection of sociologists, let alone developing an account of self-reflection that covers lay 
actors as well.  In the next section we explore the further implications of this argument. 
 
The impossibility of the reflexive habitus 
So far, the argument is that Bourdieu’s demand for epistemic reflexivity is problematic due to 
the fact that Bourdieu offers a “deficient account of the lay actor’s reflexivity.” (Peters 2014: 
141) which carries over to the capacity of reflection of the social scientist6. Yet, looking at 
contemporary literature on habitual action and self-reflection, we see some authors arguing that 
Bourdieu’s ideas on epistemic reflexivity could be transferred to the public domain to account 
for the possibility of self-reflection in the era of reflexive modernization (Beck, Giddens & 
Lash, 1994).  Such a move can be made by either (i) arguing that Bourdieu has not totally denied 
self-reflection as an agential and/or collective capacity, or (ii) trying to modify, at an ontological 
level, the definition of the habitus in order to render it compatible and mutually supportive with 
self-reflective conduct. We argue that the former theoretical strategy is not feasible, because 
Bourdieu’s project of reflexive sociology is not supported by (and should not be conflated with) 
a theory of the reflective subject; rather, the possibility of self-reflection appears here and there 
as an unrelated and unsupported residual of an antinomic character. Likewise, the latter 
ontological approaches to reconciliation between the habitus and self-reflection are misleading 
since any effort to reconcile habitual action, routine action and self-reflection should not 
analyzed in terms of Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus.  
We will argue that authors who set sail for (i), erroneously conflate Bourdieu’s 
(legitimate but unattainable within his framework) epistemic demand for a reflexive sociology 
with the possibility of the reflective subjectivity which is absent in Bourdieu. And we 
additionally argue that authors who try to remedy this lack of a social theory of the subject in 
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Bourdieu, as with some prominent critical realists who propose (ii) an ontology that combines 
both habitual action and self-reflection, need to avoid references to Bourdieu’s habitus, or 
radically modify this concept in order to do so. Ultimately, we argue, the notion of the “reflexive 
habitus” is a product of the fusion of both narrations (HS/P1 & HS/P2) as well as of the residue 
of self-reflection.  
 
(i) Theoretical reconciliation 
Authors arguing for (i), follow an opposite path than we are following in this article: they extend 
Bourdieu’s idea of the scientific habitus incorporating “a reflexivity reflex” (2004, p. 89) to 
everyday lay decision making, in an attempt to reconcile the habitus and the presupposition of 
self-reflection. In contrast, we start from the idea that self-reflection is an antinomic residual 
category in Bourdieu’s work and move to the conclusion that his epistemic request cannot be 
supported for this very reason. Our argument is that these authors fail to distinguish between 
epistemic reflexivity as theoretical auto-reference and the idea of self-reflection (Bouzanis, 
2017), and therefore, in terms of Bourdieu’s work, they conflate an epistemic request with a 
residual category of HS/P1. Ultimately this means that they try to extend an unattainable 
possibility that pertains, according to Bourdieu, only to sociologists (see, Bohman, 1997, p. 
182; Karakayali, 2004, p. 160), to other social groups. This does not resolve the genuine 
problems of incorporating a demand “to reflect” into the categorical state of individuals who 
are not attributed, by Bourdieu, any other means for thought than this unconscious substratum 
of internalized categories. In this sense, these authors try to reconcile the irreconcilable.  
Paul Sweetman (2003), for example, while acknowledging some difficulties of an effort 
of reconciliation, has attempted to combine the theoretical import of the habitus with the idea 
of self-reflective conduct, by invoking the idea of the “reflexive habitus”. This entails the 
hybridizing idea of a flexible habitus which, Sweetman argues, has been formed due to the 
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constant lack of correspondence between the habitus and the material conditions of the field 
where agents are placed. Various accounts are given of this constant lack of correspondence, 
including: the multiplicity of external shocks or crises (see also Toner, 2017) changing the 
structure of the field in a radical and continuous way; the requirement for some agents to move 
through different fields; or the lack of well-defined social fields in our post-traditional society 
such that their boundaries are overlapping, fused and malleable. This reflexive habitus, 
according to Sweetman (2003), while acquired through the passive embodiment of the 
discontinuous and turbulent experience of unstable past conditions, results in a liberating 
habitual readiness to change7. Here, “reflexivity ceases to reflect a temporary lack of fit 
between habitus and field but itself becomes habitual, and is thus incorporated into the habitus 
in the form of the flexible or reflexive habitus.” (Sweetman, 2003, p. 541)  
Following a similar logic, Nick Crossley (2003) argued for the possibility of the “radical 
habitus”, by taking the example of protest and political movements. Here, involvement in social 
critique and protest generates and is further enforced and sustained by the acquiring and 
embodying “reflexive schemas” which work as “reflexive dispositions” (2003, p. 55) to self-
interrogation.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
 
 
It is at this point at which, drawing on figure 1, we can offer a metatheoretical imaginary 
mapping of the ideas we are discussing. HS/P1 is in tension with HS/P2, and both as core 
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“stories” of the habitus/structure relation are, due to the definition of the habitus, inconsistent 
with residual references to and implications (that one can identify in Bourdieu’s thought) about 
agents’ capacity of self-reflection. One might expect that the idea of the reflexive habitus is 
premised only on HS/P2, in the sense that it is easier to travel from the “elastic habitus” of 
HS/P2 to the ideas of “radical habitus” and “reflexive habitus”. Yet a key point is that the idea 
of the reflexive habitus is a confusing product of the fusion of all three elements in figure 1, 
and here is the whole story:  self-reflection that arises occasionally, as a residue in HS/P1, as a 
product of a mismatch between the embodied habitus and the external structure (in the form of 
rational strategic action), is now necessitated more often, and thus it has become embodied in 
the flexible habitus of HS/P2 as a readiness towards the lack of morphological homology.  
This fusion of HS/P1, HS/P2 and the residue of self-reflection is also evident in recent 
efforts to argue for the theoretical reconstruction of the reflexive habitus. In Decoteau (2016), 
for example, one can see how Wacquant’s idea of the multilayered, flexible habitus of HS/P2 
(see, Hilgers, 2009) is fused with the idea of continuous “breaks” in HS/P1, with the help of the 
idea that “people’s identities are constituted precisely through their participation in more than 
one field … our interstitial positionality offers us unique positions from which to reflexively 
evaluate and navigate our structural and cultural conditioning through embodied practices.”  
(Decoteau, 2016, p. 316) Also note that Decoteau, as with several other commentators, confuses 
epistemic reflexivity with self-reflection (Decoteau, 2016, p. 313; see also, Hilgers, 2009, p. 
738).  
On this, Silva (2016) distinguishes between early notions of a unitary, monolithic 
habitus and later notions of flexible and fragmented habitus. From our perspective, Silva (2016) 
is close enough to identification of the “two stories of the habitus/structure” we are discussing 
in this paper, but she only focuses on different definitions of the habitus, and thus she does not 
place theoretical dualism in the analysis of the relationship between the habitus and structures.  
25 
 
Furthermore, the “fragmented habitus” that Silva (2016) proposes is more related to HS/P1: as 
Bourdieu, throughout his career, was more and more emphasizing structural fragmentation in 
late capitalism, as well as the emergence of semi-independent fields, the unified habitus in 
HS/P1 has become fractured in high/late modernity due to the “situational breaks” that occurred 
in contemporary agential experience. This development does not challenge our analysis: instead 
of the “monolithic versus elastic” habituses, corresponding to the HS/P1 and HS/P2 antithesis, 
in later writings, this tension is expressed in terms of “fragmented versus Elastic” habituses (or, 
accordingly, habitus clivé versus chameleon habitus; see, Friedman, 2016). In HS/P1 the basic 
relation between the habitus and structure remains the same, there is still no dialectic in this 
story. The fragmented habitus is just the cognitive blueprint of structural fragmentation – and 
thus perpetuates continuity and “code-switching” in the various fields in which the individual 
participates. Still, the elastic habitus of HS/P2 “fills the gaps”, is adapted and thus guarantees 
cognitive unification and the necessary fluidity to “respond” to transitions from one field to 
another.  
Therefore, in this paper, we are arguing that certain versions of the reflexive habitus 
conflate the idea of fragmented habitus of HS/P1, the idea of flexible/elastic habitus of HS/P2 
and the residual element of self-reflection8. In other words, the theoretically unsupported, 
residual suggestion in the case of the lack of ontological complicity in HS/P1, is internalized – 
as a now incompatible, antinomic premise which is denied by the very principle of 
internalization – and transformed into a paradoxical hybrid that takes the form of a “pre-
reflecting disposition to reflect”. What defenders of the “reflexive habitus” fail to notice is that, 
as indicated in figure 1, self-reflection is a residue of the story of HS/P1 which is ultimately 
inconsistent with the overall definition of the habitus.  
Also frequently forgotten in this discussion is that for Bourdieu the internalized 
cognitive structure deeply pervades agents’ knowledgeability, as the pre-reflective prerequisite 
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for each practical engagement with external objects (or with others), with the result that the 
unconscious dominates the spaces of intelligible (inter-)action – and this holds for both 
monolithic or fragmented habituses of HS/P1 and the flexible ever-adaptive habitus of HS/P2. 
What could it mean, then, for human beings to incorporate an intensive “need to reflect” into 
the pre-reflective repertoire of practical engagement? The story that defenders of this view have 
provided is that too many breaks and fractures in ontological complicity of HS/P1 are stretching 
out the flexible habitus of HS/P2 even further, and transforming it into a fluid layer of an 
unconscious readiness to ever change “position-taking”. But still this fluid layer is the only 
principle of the construction of the self, and to invoke self-reflection as an internalized 
disposition within this layer is to negate this very principle.  
Now, one could claim that self-reflection is a vague term meaning different things to 
different authors. For example, self-reflection can be conceived as a self-monitoring, in 
Giddens’ terms (1984) that can account for strategic action. Indeed, the above-mentioned 
authors draw on the idea of reflexive modernization (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994) so as to 
reconcile the continuous need to reflect on one’s life trajectory with Bourdieu’s habitus. But 
self-monitoring constitutes a minimalistic approach to agential powers of reflecting on the 
social world as well as on mental states, and so here we need to consider whether more concrete 
formulations of self-reflection are compatible, at an ontological level (ii), with the habitus.  
 
(ii) Ontological reconciliation 
This effort of reconciling the irreconcilable is also present in recent critical realist approaches 
to agency, with reference to Margaret Archer’s theory of self-reflection, which is a Peirceian 
version of an internal conversation between the “I” and the “Me” – where the “I” is the critical 
self and the “me” is the objectified echo of the “I”s’ past utterances (Archer 2003).  
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On this, Alistair Mutch (2004) has utilized Bourdieu’s work in order to set limits on 
Archer’s notion of the internal conversation, and Caetano (2015) recently claimed that what is 
missing from Archer’s account of reflexivity is the processes of internalization of exteriority. 
Taking a different approach, Elder-Vass (2007, 2010) realizes the difficulties of his own effort 
of reconciling Bourdieu’s account and Archer’s notion of agential reflexivity (that is, self-
reflection), and proposes a different notion of habitual dispositions. In effect he is trying to 
complement the Archerian version of the internal conversation by introducing habitual 
dispositions into it, rather than succeeding to reconcile Bourdieu’s idea(s) of the habitus and 
Archer’s formulation of self-reflection as an internal conversation.  
A detailed discussion of the arguments of Archer and Elder-Vass exceeds the scope of 
this paper. It suffices to say that Archer herself has rightly explained that the late Bourdieu's 
account of epistemic reflexivity “still left his theorising far short of recognising the necessity of 
reflexivity for social life and life in society” (Archer, 2007, p. 46), and that Sweetman’s (2003) 
effort to combine Bourdieu’s habitus and self-reflection in the hybridizing form of reflexive 
habitus is a contradiction in terms (Archer, 2010, p. 126; 2012, p. 71)  
Finally, Sayer (2010) claims that Bourdieu indirectly acknowledges self-reflection in 
his co-authored book The Weight of the World (Bourdieu et al, 1999) which “is a collection of 
interviews with people relating their internal conversations.” (Sayer, 2010, p. 111) Indeed, in 
this book, Bourdieu draws on interviews where participants frequently express their thoughts 
through inner and outer dialogues involving self-analysis (Bourdieu et al, 1999, p. 615). 
Elsewhere, Bourdieu clearly states that respondents are able to construct their own point of 
view through a process of clarification of their experiences and thoughts, “with an extraordinary 
expressive intensity” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 24) – self-analysis through which respondents can 
even consciously attempt to impose their own definition of the situation and the image they 
strategically wish to promote (1996, p. 25). But instead of this being an indication, or even a 
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proof, that Bourdieu can adequately place self-reflection in his theoretical framework of the 
habitus and the field, it rather constitutes one of those instances that the residual category of 
self-reflection appears in this framework. Hence Sayer (2010) tries to “normalize” a kind of 
theoretical “anomaly” in the periphery of a theoretical system by making reference to its mere 
appearance here and there. 
Now, one could argue that identifying Archer’s notion of self-reflection (in the form of 
internal conversation) as inconsistent with Bourdieu’s thought is neither fruitful nor original.  
For, first, this argument obliterates the possibility of developing attempts at reconciling non-
Archerian notions of self-dialogue that are (or could be) compatible with the habitus; and, 
second, Archer already argues for the incompatibility of habitus and self-dialogue, implying 
that in defending this view we are simply buying into her analysis of dialogue and self-
reflection.  We want to respond to these points in turn. 
Firstly, we want to argue that even if one of Bourdieu’s narrations of the habitus-
structure relationship was compatible with a theory of self/inner dialogue, this would not in 
itself show that this narration was compatible with the idea of self-reflection.  This is because 
there are formulations of the dialogical self that implicitly or explicitly deny self-reflection. The 
potential overlap between ideas of dialogue and self-reflection partially depends on the 
theoretical approach that is held in each case to the “I”/“others” relation (See, Marková, 2003).  
Our argument here is that dialogical relations between the “I” and “others” that do not guarantee 
a minimum possibility of dissociation between them, lead to the oversocialized path of mutual 
constitution – undermining the idea of a minimum core “self” with continuous and integrating 
“I”-conduct. This means that even if one erroneously argued, like Sayer (2010), that Bourdieu’s 
notion of the habitus is consistent with a kind of a dialogic aspect of the formation of the self, 
this would not necessarily entail that we need to abandon our argument that self-reflection 
constitutes a residual element in Bourdieu. Unless one can show how the habitus coincides with 
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a form of self-reflection, and not simply that Bourdieu refers to potential self-dialogues of 
interviewees, our conclusion that self-reflection is an antinomic residual element in Bourdieu’s 
work should be the default position. To put it more directly, even if agents in Bourdieu’s world-
view can phenomenally proceed to externalized monologues, revealed to an investigator, his 
theory demands that their utterances can only be the practical verbalization of common-sensical 
visions enabled by the collective unconscious, the habitus.  
Secondly, to avoid the charge that we are simply embracing Archer’s approach, we want 
to point out that there are other productive ways of thinking about dialogue, self-reflection and 
habitual action which avoid the problems with Bourdieu’s theorising.  One influential approach 
to the dialogical self is offered by Norbert Wiley (1994, 2006a, 2006b, 2010) who intends to 
combine Mead’s “I-me” formulation of the “inner speech” with Peirce’s “I-you” formulation, 
by proposing an “I-you-me” triadic notion of reflexivity in contrast to – and thus enhancing and 
complementing – the two dyads proposed by Mead and Peirce. Wiley attributes to the “me” 
component five partially heterogeneous contents; these are the “generalized other”, “habits”, 
“memory”, “interface with body” and the “self-concept”. Yet, the discussion here is all-
encompassing and, “there is no reason why all three cannot take turns speaking, and for the 
dialogue to be between the ‘me’ and ‘you’, as well as between the ‘me’ and ‘I’ (or the ‘you’ 
and ‘I’)” (Wiley, 2010, p. 20). For this triadic relationship to occur, the self should stand 
simultaneously both in the past (“me”), present (“I”) and future (“you”). Wiley’s active and 
imaginative “I” is missing from Bourdieu’s thought, but the former’s anti-reductionist analysis 
of the self (see, Wiley, 1994) shows that it is feasible and reasonable for authors to incorporate 
habitual action into the analysis of the discursive (re-)production of the self, without forcibly 
invoking a social unconscious.   
We have argued that the idea of self-reflection in Bourdieu’s work has an antinomic 
character in his theoretical work, which means that further efforts of reconciling this element 
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with his key concepts of the habitus and the field are condemned to antinomy. Yet, we have 
also argued that other efforts at combining theories of self-reflection and habitual action are 
more promising. Note that these efforts do not in principle confine self-reflection to social 
scientists and their conduct, but rather examine the theoretical possibility of the diffusion among 
the population of the capacity of critical examination of ideas and worldviews. This 
acknowledgement can be combined with an analysis of the capacity to reflect on situational 
logics in relation to the critical choice among different principles and values that can be applied 
to judgements and decisions that are made in and through interaction within various 
microcosms (for further discussion on this, see Bohman, 1997; Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, 
2006; Bouzanis, 2017; Telling, 2016)  
 
Conclusion  
In this article, we have argued that a careful mapping of the topography of Bourdieu’s 
theoretical arguments is needed to understand whether or not there is a potential for the concept 
of self-reflection to be systematically incorporated into them.  Our argument has been that there 
are different narrations of the habitus-structure relationship – HS/P1 and HS/P2 – neither of 
which gives, nor has a place for, a substantial conception of self-reflection.  Following on from 
this we have criticized those authors who attempt to fuse aspects of these narrations with 
Bourdieu’s residual references to self-reflection and/or epistemic reflexivity in order to engage 
in the discussion of reflexive modernization.  Our contention is that those authors arguing for 
the contemporary emergence of a reflexive habitus have crucially misunderstood Bourdieu’s 
notion of a (epistemically) reflexive sociology. The latter is an (untenable) collective epistemic 
demand for sociologists – and not others – to realize and incorporate the ideas of the habitus 
and the field such that they will be able to transcend determinations and externalities that 
premise heteronomy quickly and more efficiently. Bourdieu makes no further demand for a 
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socio-cultural extension of this epistemic demand to the whole of society; nor does he offer any 
account of self-reflective subjectivity to support either demand.  We have also argued that some 
attempts to reconcile routine/habitual action and self-reflection go wrong because they believe 
Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus can play a role in such a synthesis. Whether this kind of 
reconciliation can be achieved is another question, but we are confident that Bourdieu’s 
conception of the habitus is a hindrance to such a project not a helping hand.  Our claim has 
been that understanding the structure of Bourdieu’s theorizing can facilitate further debates in 
this area by showing where there is potential for development and where attempts at elaboration 
will result in contradiction and, ultimately, frustration. 
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Endnotes 
1 We use the terms “agential reflexivity” and “self-reflection” as synonyms in this article. 
2 In this quotation, the word “them” refers to practices and not to the conditions of production of the 
habitus. 
3 See also Bourdieu (1977, p. 79) and King’s critique (2000). 
4 See, Strand and Lizardo (2017, p. 170) 
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5 In this context the term “hysteresis” refers to the mismatch of interacting parts whereby the historically-
formed habitus does not “fit” with the present day conditions (the contemporary structure of the field). 
6 On this, see Jenkins (1994, pp. 101-2).  
7 See also Farrugia (2013) 
8 See, for example, how Mouzelis (2007) admits in the first place that Bourdieu’s effort to transcend the 
subject/object distinction through the notion of the habitus has excluded strategic action from social life, 
while Mouzelis still utilizes the notion of the reflexive habitus so as to combine it with the former. 
